THE student-led anti-quota movement has made the headlines globally, not only for its original demands but also for the broader implications it carried for the entire country. Initially sparked by grievances over the government’s quota system in public sector jobs, the movement evolved swiftly into a much larger political struggle. What started as a demand for a fair employment system became a violent protest that removed the fascist regime of the then prime minister Sheikh Hasina. This trajectory of the protest mirrors the characteristics of a colour revolution rather than a traditional radicalising revolution primarily because of its nationalist and democratic aims rather than class-based or ideological goals.

Colour revolutions typically emerge in societies with considerable urbanisation and moderate inequality with support from urban population, students, professional and business groups. In contrast, radical revolutions are most likely to arise in countries marked by excessive social and economic inequality. This has been the most common form of revolution, particularly with the spread of the communist ideology in the late 20th century. However, as Bunce and Wolchik argue, colour revolutions have spread beyond former Soviet Union countries and Eastern Europe, thus taking over as the most dominant form of revolution since the beginning of the 21st century.

From anti-quota to anti-fascism

THE anti-quota movement was unique in its origin and evolution. Initially, it appeared a straightforward protest by students demanding a reasonable reform in the government job quota system, which they argued was disproportionately beneficial to certain groups at the expense of meritocracy. However, as the movement gained momentum, the government using all its political and administrative apparatus, including the police, the Rapid Action Battalion, the Border Guard Bangladesh and the army, frequently attempted to suppress the protesters.

In earlier days of protests, many students and ordinary people died and became injured in a brutal crackdown by the Chhatra League with the support of the law enforcement agencies. It became clear that the underlying discontent was going to extend far beyond job quotas. The students, subsequently supported by people from all walks of life, began to demand the resignation of the authoritarian Sheikh Hasina’s government, accusing it of killing students and children and of abusing rights, and, of course, suppressing dissent.

This shift from a specific policy issue to a broader anti-regime protest is a hallmark of what Jack Goldstone, an expert in political and social revolution studies, describes as a ‘colour revolution’ — a term used to describe peaceful uprisings against authoritarian governments, characterised by mass mobilisation, non-violent resistance and the pursuit of democratic reforms. The anti-quota movement in Bangladesh followed this pattern closely. It was not driven by a radical ideology aiming to overthrow the entire social order or redistribute wealth, but rather by a collective desire to restore democratic norms and protect civil liberties.

Unlike radicalising revolutions that pursue class-based or ideological transformations leading to a more authoritarian or centralised rule, the student-led movement in Bangladesh had clear nationalist and democratic objectives. The primary goal was to end what was perceived as the increasingly autocratic rule of Sheikh Hasina. The movement’s leaders and participants were motivated by a desire to protect the nation’s democratic institutions and ensure fair governance rather than to impose a new ideological order. This distinguishes the movement from classic revolutionary scenarios like those in France or Russia, where radical factions sought to completely dismantle the existing power structures and establish new, ideologically-driven regimes.

In this sense, the Bangladesh movement was more akin to other colour revolutions, such as those seen in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution or Georgia’s Rose Revolution, where the driving force was a collective call for democracy and national self-determination. The movement’s success, resulting in the eventual departure of Hasina and her close associates, marked a significant victory for democratic forces in Bangladesh.

Collapse of Hasina regime, likelihood of counter-revolution

ONE of the defining features of successful colour revolutions is the rapid collapse of the incumbent regime’s political and administrative infrastructure. In Bangladesh, the Hasina regime’s support base disintegrated quickly following the peak of the anti-quota movement. Key political figures fled the country and the administrative machinery that had sustained the Awami League’s grip on power crumbled. This collapse was not merely a tactical retreat but indicated a profound and likely irreversible disintegration of the regime’s ability to govern.

The theoretical possibility of a counter-revolution, which typically arises when the deposed regime retains some level of popular or military support, appears highly unlikely in Bangladesh’s case. The mass exodus of regime figures, including prime minister Hasina, left the Awami League without any leadership or a strong ideological foundation to mobilise its supporters for an immediate comeback. The disarray within the party and, more important, the loss of administrative control mean that any attempt at counter-revolution would naturally fail.

The informal coalition that drove the anti-quota movement was wide-ranging and inclusive, reaching the level of a national unity. It included various segments of society that had suffered under Hasina’s regime, from political opposition groups to ordinary citizens who were extremely fed up with corruption and repression. Despite the diversity of the coalition, there was a strong consensus on the movement’s goals: the removal of Hasina from power and the restoration of democracy. This unity was crucial in preventing the kind of ideological splits that often lead to counter-revolutions or civil wars between parties of the coalition.

According to the theory of revolution, counter-revolutions are more likely in situations where the revolutionary coalition is ideologically fragmented or where external forces intervene to restore the old order. In Bangladesh, neither of the conditions appears to be present. The coalition remains unified in its democratic and nationalist ambitions and there is no sign of civil war or foreign intervention that could destabilise the new government. The spirit of counter-revolution, therefore, seems remote.

India’s position and display of propaganda on media

INDIA’S reaction to the post-revolution events in Bangladesh adds another layer of complexity to the post-revolutionary scenario. The most scandalous but unsurprising one is to provide shelter for the fugitive Hasina approving the fact that the neighbouring country always politically sheltered the Hasina regime over one and a half decades. This is not clear what India gains from sheltering a dictator who is accused of giving orders to murder and abduct political dissents. The country has already been suffering from mistrust by most of its neighbours and keeping Hasina for the long run would exacerbate the situation. In this circumstance, why India is playing a dubious role rather than attempting to repair its diplomatic relations with Bangladesh by taking pragmatic steps about Hasina is extremely hard to understand.

While some Indian media outlets attempted to cast the outcome of the anti-fascist movement in a communal light, suggesting that anti-Hindu sentiments has been on the rise after the regime change, these narratives have been largely debunked by more credible sources of the western media, including BBC and Al Jazeera. Moreover, India’s porime minister Narendra Modi was swift to recognise the new government led by Dr Yunus, indicating that India is not likely to support any counter-revolutionary efforts to reinstall Hasina.

Here, the comparison with Iran’s revolution, where external war played a significant role in radicalising the revolution and bringing more extreme factions to power, underscores the importance of India’s stance. Unlike Iraq’s invasion of Iran, which provided the conditions for the radicalisation of the Iranian Revolution, no such external threat from India looms over Bangladesh. Consequently, the chances of a counter-revolution driven by radical elements within the coalition or by external forces remain low.

Future of Bangladesh’s colour revolution

THE threat of a counter-revolution, while always has a theoretical possibility, appears to be minimal in the current context. The general consensus among the revolutionary coalition, the collapse of the Hasina regime’s support structures and the lack of external threats in terms of war all point to a stable political situation and a continuation of the moderate government until a suitable environment for a power transition through free and fair elections. The challenge now lies in consolidating the gains of the revolution and building a political system that can resist the authoritarian temptation that plagued its predecessor.

As Bangladesh moves forward from this historic moment, the focus must shift to ensuring that the new government upholds the democratic values that inspired the revolution. The opportunity presented by this colour revolution is significant: it allows for the establishment of a moderate government capable of reforming the institutions that were corrupted under the previous regime.

The new government’s ability to restructure institutions, bring perpetrators of the previous regime to justice, to hold free, fair and participatory elections and, more important, to deliver an institutional configuration for the subsequent elected governments where democratic values are maintained will be the ultimate test of whether the revolution’s goals are being diligently pursued. If the lessons of other colour revolutions hold true, Bangladesh stands at the threshold of a new democratic era.

Dr Muhammad Ashikur Rahman is a lecturer in work and employment, College of Business, University of Leicester.